Abstract. Why do new parties split? Scholars of new party schisms shy away from leadership-centred explanations for fear of excessive voluntarism and thus fail to conceptualise differences between leaders systematically. This article challenges that trend, arguing that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders generate cohesion in new parties. It analyses why some externally appealing leaders are internally dominant, while others are not, and argues that this variation can make the difference between schism and survival. The article supports its argument through a representative case study: the fatal (and consequential) schism of Peru's United Left coalition in the late s.
Introduction
The vast majority of new political parties die.  Nevertheless, existing scholarship largely ignores unsuccessful cases of party-building and focuses on the small number of success stories.  This selection on the dependent variable is authority, cross-factional ties, and ideological representativeness. Thus, whereas some externally appealing leaders are internally dominant, others are not. This variation can make the difference between schism and survival. Externally appealing, internally dominant leaders do not merely provide coat-tails, which discourage elite defection; they facilitate collective decisionmaking and conflict resolution, and, because of their pre-eminence, they seldom have incentives to defect. Leaders who are not internally dominant, no matter how externally appealing, are less capable of facilitating collective decision-making and conflict resolution, and because of the limitations on their internal power, they are more liable to defect. The consequences of such defections for fledgling parties can be harmful, even fatal.
The article demonstrates this argument's causal mechanisms at work in the 'typical', or 'representative', case of Peru's IU.  The collapse of IU was a consequential political event in Peru, and the article's empirical contribution is to shed new light on this previously studied event through an application of the above theoretical argument. The case study illustrates how a new party with numerous assets and advantages, IU, can fatally splinter due to the presence of an electorally indispensable leader who is not internally dominant (i.e., Alfonso Barrantes). It argues, more specifically, that Alfonso Barrantes's weak cross-factional ties, lack of moral authority and low ideological representativeness limited his power within IU, especially during the second half of the s; that his lack of internal dominance led to his defection; and that, because he was electorally indispensable, his defection resulted in IU's collapse. The case study draws on interviews with IU members and scholars,  archival materials,  and underutilised secondary literature in Spanish.  These information sources () provide otherwise hard-to-obtain case details, both  See Jason Seawright and John Gerring, 'Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research', Political Research Quarterly, :  (), pp. -.  During a five-week trip to Lima, Peru, I conducted interviews with  IU members and one scholar who was not an IU member but has researched IU in depth (Martín Tanaka). In this article, I cite interviews with seven of those individuals: six IU members (Javier Diez Canseco, Henry Pease, Aldo Panfichi, Santiago Pedraglio, Mario Munive, Antonio Zapata) and the aforementioned Martín Tanaka.  I found the archives of the left-leaning La República particularly useful. See below.  Here, I refer especially to Guillermo Herrera, Izquierda Unida y el Partido Comunista (Lima:
Termil, ). Herrera, Izquierda Unida is a factual and painstakingly detailed account of IU's genesis, development and fatal split. Many of the highest-quality sources on IU were written before the publication of Herrera, Izquierda Unida, factual  and perspectival;  () furnish evidence of the theory's causal mechanisms at work;  and () support the article's comparative argument concerning IU and Brazil's PT.  The article presents additional evidence for its theoretical argument through a brief analysis of two shadow cases, Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD. It treats the early PT and PRD as the 'most similar' cases to IU and argues that, despite analytically relevant similarities to IU, both parties had electorally indispensable leaders who were internally dominant (Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, respectively), helping them to avoid schism.
The article does not purport to prove or even test its argument. Rather, the article is an exercise in theory-building: it presents a theoretical argument and provides initial evidence of plausibility and generalisability in the form of a representative case study and a brief most-similar-cases comparison. The primary contribution of the article, thus, is the proposition of a new, empirically grounded theory.
Finally, although the evidence in this article relates to IU (and secondarily to the PT and the PRD), the argument should apply to all new parties, regardless of where they fall on the Left/Right spectrum.
The article is organised in three sections. The first section elaborates the theory. The second operationalises the dependent and independent variables. The third presents the IU case study, addresses alternative explanations, and compares IU to the PT and PRD. A brief conclusion follows.
The Argument
Party-building is the process by which new parties develop into electorally significant and enduring political actors. To be considered a case of successful party-building, a new party must both persist over time and consistently win a large proportion of the national vote. Unsuccessful new parties include those that do not take off electorally, those that collapse after experiencing brief electoral success, and those that persist over time but receive only a tiny share of the vote.  When new parties collapse after experiencing brief electoral success, schisms are often the cause.  Internal conflict is a normal feature of party life, as parties must take collective decisions on numerous issues (e.g., candidate selection, platforms, alliances) and, more fundamentally, agree on decision-making procedures. Because groups may conflict in these areas, schisms are a risk for parties.
New parties are especially prone to schisms. Why? First, most parties, in their early years, are in the process of developing their partisan brands, which requires them to differentiate themselves from other parties and demonstrate consistency over time.  New partisan brands thus tend to be works-in-progress -and hence too weak and fragile to discourage elite defection. Second, new parties tend to lack institutionalised rules and procedures for collective decision-making and conflict settlement.
Largely due to the weakness of new partisan brands, only a tiny fraction of new parties take off electorally in the first place.  A striking proportion of this tiny subset owe their electoral success to a popular leader's coat-tails.  Particularly in presidential systems, leaders' external appeal can be a crucial source of mass support for incipient parties.  In Latin America, which is uniformly presidentialist, founding leaders have laid the foundation for several lasting partisan brands (e.g., Peronism in Argentina, Fujimorismo in Peru, Chavismo in Venezuela), and in more institutionalised parties like the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, APRA) and Acción Popular (Popular Action, AP) in Peru; the Partido de Liberación Nacional (National Liberation Party, PLN) In effect, popular leaders substitute for strong brands. Their coat-tails, like strong brands, guarantee electoral relevance and therefore discourage defection. But popular leaders do not ensure cohesion. Indeed, new parties that electorally depend on a leader are vulnerable to fatal schisms because, if the leader defects, they collapse. In recent decades, several new Latin American parties have collapsed because a popular leader defected. Peru's IU crumbled after Alfonso Barrantes's  exit. Guatemala's PAN virtually disappeared after Álvaro Arzú and presidential candidate Óscar Berger left the party in the early s. Colombia's PVC did not survive the departure of its presidential candidate and best-known figure, Antanas Mockus. In other cases, popular leaders, despite providing coat-tails, fail to prevent mass defection. Venezuela's LCR, for example, fell into obscurity after the defection of the bulk of its active members, who backed factional leader Pablo Medina against popular leader Andrés Velásquez.  This article's central argument is that if leaders combine external appeal with internal dominance, the risk of such schisms decreases substantially. Why should this be so? And where does internal dominance come from?
The Sources of Internal Dominance
Internal dominance is defined as uncontested, pre-eminent power within one's party. When a leader dominates, he stands 'head and shoulders' above the rest of the party elite. No elite can seriously challenge him for the presidential nomination, vie with him for control of the party, or advocate his expulsion without being marginalised.  Internal power comes from multiple sources. One, undoubtedly, is external appeal. If party members depend on a leader's coat-tails, they have material incentives to accommodate and support him, and not to defect. Nevertheless, external appeal, by itself, does not make a leader internally dominant. Why? There are two broad reasons. First, in some parties, important factions are not driven primarily, or even at all, by electoral incentives (e.g., Mexico's early PRD;  Peru's IU). Insofar as members are ideologues, not pragmatic office seekers, popular leaders do not gain internal leverage from their external appeal. Second, there are multiple sources of internal power; external appeal is just one, and internal dominance requires additional sources.
One additional source is cross-factional ties. In factionalised parties, a leader with constructive relationships across factions may be 'indispensable' for brokerage and mediation.  Leaders who are disengaged, or who refuse to negotiate with major factions, cannot serve as cross-factional mediators and brokers. Because it takes time to develop cross-factional ties, a leader with strong pre-existing cross-factional ties may be critical in the case of incipient parties. Here, one encounters variation. Some leaders have strong pre-existing cross-factional ties because they led their parties' founding struggles and, in the process, collaborated with most party feeder organisations (e.g., Lula of Brazil's PT). Others have weak pre-existing cross-factional ties. Indeed, individuals may be made leaders precisely because they are relative outsiders and thus do not empower any faction at the expense of others (e.g., Barrantes of Peru's IU).
Moral authority is a second internal power source. Moral authority means a leader's credibility and respect among party members, usually due to his pre-party background. Here, too, we encounter variation. Certain leaders command respect or reverence among their base. Some even have a mystical quality, or are considered fundamental to the party's identity or the incarnation of its animating cause. Such stature may result from revolutionary ancestry (e.g., Cárdenas of Mexico's PRD); class status (e.g., Lula of Brazil's PT); heroism (e.g., Charles de Gaulle of the French Republicans); public hardship (e.g., Nelson Mandela of South Africa's African National Congress [ANC]); leadership in founding struggles (e.g., Lula; Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union [ZANU]); and more. Moral authority can also be rooted in personal charisma.  By contrast, some figures are made leaders despite lacking moral authority. This might happen when, as described above, a new party chooses an outsider as leader (e.g., Barrantes of Peru's IU).
A third source of internal power is ideological/programmatic representativeness of the active base. Although rank-and-file attitudes are usually heterogeneous, and although leaders tend to have significant autonomy from the In sum, internal power does not merely come from external appeal. It also comes from cross-factional ties, moral authority and ideological representativeness. Each of these sources is potentially independent of the rest,  although some often reinforce others.  Regardless, they contribute to a leader's internal power independently and will be treated as roughly equal in weight (see Figure ) . The more of these sources, and the more of each source, that a leader possesses, the more internally powerful he will be. Consequently, new party leaders, even externally appealing ones, vary in internal power. Simply put, some are internally dominant, while others are not (see section 'Operationalisation' below).
This argument is primarily structuralist, not voluntarist. To be sure, a leader's internal dominance is not wholly static; external events, as well as a leader's own contingent decisions, can lead to short-term changes in his cross-factional ties, moral authority and ideological representativeness. Nevertheless, a leader's prior endowments (e.g., pre-existing cross-factional ties, political background) largely determine the parameters and likelihood of such changes. It is much easier to maintain pre-existing cross-factional ties, for example, than to establish them from scratch after a party is founded. Similarly, it is much easier to establish moral authority if one has a symbolically resonant pedigree, or a background as a hero or leader of a political or social movement. Seldom is internal dominance a pure product of individual effort, prudence or savvy. Internal dominance tends to be based, in large measure, on objective endowments: electoral clout, pre-existing cross-factional links, ancestry, and backgrounds of leadership, heroism, or hardship. Cárdenas  See, for example, Steven Levitsky, Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America:
Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective (New York: Cambridge University Press, ).  Some party brokers establish cross-factional ties without moral authority or ideological appeal -e.g., Helmut Kohl (Ansell and Fish, 'The Art of Being Indispensable'), Carlos Menem (Levitsky, Transforming Labor-Based Parties). Some have moral authority but lack, or come to lack, cross-factional ties (e.g., Cárdenas after retiring from active involvement in the PRD) or ideological/programmatic representativeness (e.g., Lula in the mid-s, when radicals controlled the PT). And, of course, a party member may align ideologically with most active rank-and-file members but, not occupying a leadership position, lack moral authority and cross-factional ties. On Lula in the PT, see Wendy Hunter, The Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, - (New York: Cambridge University Press, ).  Ideological representativeness (and consistency) can contribute to a leader's moral authority (e.g., Cárdenas vis-à-vis the PRD base). Both ideological representativeness and moral authority make it easier for a leader to forge cross-factional links (e.g., Lula, Cárdenas). of Mexico's PRD, for example, was not a once-in-a-generation leader like Lula da Silva in Brazil's early PT, but he still dominated internal PRD affairs due to his endowments (see case study section 'The Argument at Work' below for details).
How Externally Appealing, Internally Dominant Leaders Prevent Schisms
How do externally appealing, internally dominant leaders prevent new party schisms? As noted earlier, most new parties, especially heterogeneous, massbased ones, lack strong internal institutions. Often, a new party's feeder groups lack horizontal linkages. Consequently, new parties often cannot, through institutional channels, aggregate preferences and collectively take decisions and settle conflicts. Some parties eventually develop strong institutions,  but new parties must do so from scratch and avoid alienating key players in the process. Institution building, thus, is delicate and slow. Many new parties lack formal decision-making procedures in important areas (e.g., Venezuela's LCR;  Mexico's early PRD).  Others establish unanimity or near unanimity requirements for collective decision-making (e.g., Peru's IU). Under these circumstances, schism becomes a risk, as conflicts may persist without resolution, and reforms may be obstructed.
Externally appealing, internally dominant leaders can solve these problems. First, they can found dominant factions, which control party machinery and simplify collective decision-making (e.g., Lula; Cárdenas).  Second, they can influence internal debates (e.g., on platforms, alliances), often in their own favour. Morally authoritative leaders, for example, can convince members to moderate or compromise for the party's electoral gain (e.g., Lula).  Internally dominant leaders can leverage party candidacies and posts in internal debates (e.g., Cárdenas). The inability to influence debates in these ways may motivate a leader to defect (e.g., Barrantes). Third, internally dominant leaders can informally function as preference aggregators, decision-makers and arbiters. In parties with limited internal democracy and weak horizontal ties between factions, a leader with cross-factional links can collect viewpoints and factor them into party decision-making (e.g., Cárdenas). Importantly, internally dominant leaders enjoy considerable leeway to take decisions in the name of their parties (e.g., Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre in Peru's APRA; Juan Perón of Argentina's Partido Justicialista [Justicialist Party or Peronist Party, PJ]; Roberto D'Aubuisson in El Salvador's ARENA; Jaime Guzmán in Chile's UDI; Cárdenas; Lula). In many cases, their word is effectively law, meaning that they can arbitrate conflict and impose party lines, even controversial ones, unilaterally (e.g., Cárdenas). Morally authoritative leaders are less likely to be viewed as fakes, traitors or sell-outs if they moderate over time or sacrifice party principles for practical gain (e.g., Lula in the early s).  Leaders denied such leeway are more liable to defect (e.g., Barrantes). In short, just as popular leaders substitute for strong brands, internally dominant leaders can substitute for institutions of decision-making and conflict resolution. Moreover, externally appealing, internally dominant leaders can win presidential nominations with limited internal resistance (e.g., Lula; Cárdenas). This is critical for cohesion, as presidential nominations are winner-take-all choices with singular stakes. Internally non-dominant leaders, even highly popular ones, may face serious competition for presidential nominations. In such cases, schism might result, as whoever is not nominated, or fears not being nominated, could defect (e.g., Barrantes).
Externally appealing, internally dominant leaders are neither necessary nor sufficient for new party cohesion. Parties can hang together initially without such leaders (e.g., Mexico's Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
Operationalisation
This brief section operationalises the dependent (DV) and independent (IV) variables, then previews the third section and comparative conclusion by scoring IU and two most similar cases, Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD.
New party schism (DV): New party schisms occur if a party, after winning  per cent of the vote in one to four consecutive congressional elections, permanently falls below  per cent due to a leader or faction's defection.  External appeal (IV): During a party's first decade, what ratio of major factional leaders considered the leader the party's most electable member? If most or all factional leaders did, the leader's external appeal is high; if a large minority did, his external appeal is medium; otherwise, his external appeal is low.
Cross-factional ties (IV): During a party's first decade, what ratio of major factional leaders did the leader consistently meet with, and what ratio of major factions did he consistently support including in the party? If the answer is a large majority or all of the major factions, his cross-factional ties are strong; if the answer is a large minority or small majority, his cross-factional ties are medium; otherwise, his cross-factional ties are weak.
Ideological representativeness (IV): During a party's first decade, what ratio of active members generally supported the leader in ideological/programmatic debates? If most did, the leader's ideological representativeness is high; if a large minority did, his representativeness is medium; if a small minority did, his representativeness is low.
Moral authority (IV): If the leader entered the party with an extraordinary source of mystique, credibility or respect such as revolutionary pedigree or a background of heroism, public hardship or leadership in founding struggles, his moral authority is high; if he played a consistent but lower-profile role as a cadre or leader in party-related movements in the years or decades before the party's creation, his moral authority is medium; otherwise, his moral authority is low.
Internal dominance (composite IV): A leader's internal dominance is scored by adding his scores on external appeal, cross-factional ties, ideological  FREPASO's leader, Carlos 'Chacho' Álvarez, was electorally indispensable and internally dominant, but FREPASO collapsed in the early s after Álvarez's exit. See, for example, Juan Abal Medina, 'The Rise and Fall of the Argentine Center-Left: The Crisis of Frente Grande', Party Politics, :  (), pp. -.  The  per cent minimum serves to exclude niche or regional parties, which may persist but do not seriously contend for national power. The four-election minimum serves to exclude flash parties, which rise to national prominence but quickly collapse (e.g., IU, Argentina's FREPASO).
representativeness and moral authority. Two 'high' and two 'medium' scores are required for internal dominance; lower sums indicate lack of internal dominance. IU is thus a case of new party schism, having met the  per cent threshold only twice (, ) and collapsing due to Alfonso Barrantes's defection. The conclusion's most similar cases, the PT and PRD, did not split, surviving early development intact and taking root. They have stayed above  per cent in seven (-) and eight (-) consecutive congressional elections, respectively.
Tables  and  provide scores for IU (highlighted) as well as for the PT and PRD. The case study and conclusion, to which we now turn, provide supporting information for these scores. Figure  illustrates, visually, that whereas IU's popular leader, Barrantes, lacked internal dominance, the popular leaders of the PT and PRD, Lula and Cárdenas, were internally dominant.
The Argument at Work: The Schism of Peru's IU IU was a socialist electoral coalition founded in September , shortly after the May  general election that marked Peru's full transition from military rule to democracy. In both the May  general election and the  constituent assembly election, the Peruvian Left ran divided, with numerous parties and coalitions competing on separate tickets. Although the Left fared well in , riding a wave of social mobilisation and benefiting from the absence of rival party AP on the ballot,  its relatively poor showing in the  general election demonstrated that, under normal electoral conditions, Left success would require Left unity. Thus was born IU, which comprised most of Peru's major Left forces and which was established in advance of the November  municipal elections.
During the s, IU established itself as one of Peru's three leading electoral forces, alongside APRA and AP. But in late , IU fatally split. Less than a year before the  presidential election, and less than two months before nationwide municipal elections, Alfonso Barrantes, IU's ex-president and perennial lead candidate, decided after months of political jockeying and tortuous negotiations to defect from IU with a small group of allies and contest the  municipal and  general elections independently. Barrantes's defection resulted in IU's collapse. In the  presidential election, IU and Barrantes split the Left vote. Both performed abysmally, and neither recovered. In the early s, Barrantes retired from politics, and IU disbanded.
IU's collapse was a consequential event, given the coalition's potential prior to the collapse and the likely effects of its disintegration. In the four national  AP boycotted the election. elections that IU contested with Barrantes as its lead candidate -nationwide municipal elections in ,  and , and the  general election -it averaged nearly  per cent of the national vote. At the time of its schism, IU had an opportunity to capitalise on the electoral weakness of its two main competitors, APRA and AP. Pre-election polls conducted prior to Barrantes's defection, throughout  and , indicated that Barrantes and right-wing candidate Mario Vargas Llosa would be the two top finishers Among Left politicians in the s, Alfonso Barrantes was singularly popular with lower-income voters, a massive, floating and decisive segment of the national electorate. Although lower-income Peruvians tended to support redistribution during this period, they did not support any party and certainly did not support the partisan Left. But many supported Barrantes, who humanised and softened the Left's radical, militant image. In contrast to most of his Left contemporaries in Peru, Barrantes was seen not only as professional and competent, but also as non-militant and personable. He was articulate, educated and well-informed on a wide range of political and economic issues. He was friendly, good-humoured and non-combative in speeches and interviews. He avoided rhetoric that alienated ordinary voters. He had provincial roots, hailing from the Cajamarca region, and conveyed a rural simplicity. He displayed particular fondness for children, regularly invoking them in his speeches and coming to be known, affectionately, as Tío Frejolito (Uncle Bean) by the Peruvian public. Barrantes's signature policy as Lima mayor (-) guaranteed one glass of milk per day to every child in Lima. Barrantes was known for being honest. Despite his high public profile, and even after becoming Lima mayor, he did not enrich himself or develop expensive habits, always (for example) driving the same sky-blue  Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, p. . Tanaka, Los espejismos, p. .
Lewis Taylor, 'One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Peruvian Izquierda Unida, -', The Journal of Communist Studies, :  (), p. .  IU parties had ties to a range of popular and middle-sector organisations, both class-based (e.g., peasant, labour and teachers' unions) and territorially based (e.g., shanty-town associations). Some of these ties dated back many decades (e. 
Barrantes's Lack of Internal Dominance
In short, no Left figure emerged in Peru during the s who could rival Barrantes in electoral clout. Barrantes's lack of dominance within IU, thus, did not stem from a shortage of external appeal. Indeed, a noteworthy feature of IU's internal politics was that Barrantes's unrivalled external appeal, almost universally recognised, did not translate into internal dominance. As Martín Tanaka writes of Barrantes in  and : 'It is interesting to note the enormous distance between a Barrantes well positioned in the electoral preferences of the citizenry and his situation of extreme weakness within the Left … The separation between the electoral arena and internal party arena, the difficulty of investing the capital accumulated in one in the other, appears clearly.'  Barrantes's electoral indispensability did not translate into internal dominance for two broad reasons. First, radical IU elites, who constituted approximately half of the coalition's national leadership, were not primarily motivated by the desire to maximise vote share or govern on a large scale, and, by the end of the s, some of them regarded the prospect of an IU presidential victory as threatening (about which more below). This reduced Barrantes's internal electoral leverage. Second, Barrantes had few sources of internal power other than his external appeal: his moral authority was limited; his relationship with powerful radical leaders was contentious and ultimately broke down completely; and radical IU members, who constituted a majority of the coalition's active rank-and-file, differed with Barrantes on major questions of programme and principle. These problems also worsened toward the end of the s, and, consequently, Barrantes's internal power came to rest on little more than electoral leverage.
Clearly, Barrantes's internal challenges must be understood in the context of IU's moderate-radical divide. Like many successful new Left parties in Latin America,  IU was composed of radical and moderate tendencies. Although IU members were uniformly socialist and almost uniformly Marxist-Leninist,  radicals and moderates differed on how to pursue socialist transformation. Whereas moderates sought to transform Peru through participation in its democratic institutions, radicals sought to make revolution in the short to medium term. Radicals, of course, did value democratic participation; otherwise, they would not have joined IU or contested elections. But they participated in elections largely in order to campaign and engage in legislative opposition, both of which provided visibility and attracted members. They were more ambivalent and cautious than moderates about taking executive power locally or nationally. Some argued that governing might dilute IU's message, deliver unspectacular results, and therefore harm the Left's image.  Polarisation between moderates and radicals intensified in the late s, as hyperinflation, recession and the Shining Path insurgency convulsed Peru. A central question arose: How should IU respond to Peru's security and economic crises, which threatened democratic stability? Moderates wanted to preserve democracy and capitalise electorally on the reputational collapse of IU's two main rivals, APRA and AP.  Since this would require attracting middlesector voters, IU, they believed, needed to moderate its rhetoric and proposals.  Accordingly, moderates rejected armed struggle and advocated collaborating with the APRA government and Peruvian armed forces to stabilise the economy and defeat the Shining Path. Radicals offered a different response to the crisis of the late s. They judged -arguably rationally  -that the country was entering a revolutionary situation. Thus, in their view, organisational preparedness for revolution took priority over victory in the  presidential election.  Radicals opposed allying with APRA  and the military  and resisted shifting to the ideological centre. Many were hesitant to reject armed struggle categorically.  Such actions and positions, they argued, could dilute the partisan Left's image  and might put IU in power at a time of insoluble crisis.  Both would impede recruitment of foot soldiersa top priority. A key implication of the radicals' worldview was that, for them, Barrantes's electoral coat-tails held limited value. Throughout the s, IU radicals did not regard electoral failure -their own, much less IU's -as an existential risk or their ultimate concern. Some were wary of governing and hence of winning the executive positions that Barrantes sought. These perspectives hardened toward the end of the decade. In the late s, radicals 'were less interested in building the widest possible electoral base for the United Left than in building an organised, revolutionary alternative to existing power structures'.  Many radicals considered a  presidential victory secondary;  some considered it counterproductive and potentially threatening.  All of these realities reduced Barrantes's internal electoral leverage.
Even more unfortunately for Barrantes, however, popular appeal was the main 'card' that he had to 'play' within IU. His most significant shortcoming as IU leader was that his internal power rested principally on electoral leverage -particularly as the s drew to a close.
That Barrantes lacked additional sources of internal power followed, in large measure, from the conditions of his selection as coalition leader. Because the IU constituent parties were sectarian, IU founding leaders were not willing to cede the coalition's reins and lead nomination to a partisan rival. Barrantes was unaffiliated with the parties  and regarded as fairly neutral between them.  His independence and neutrality, combined with In addition to lacking moral authority, Barrantes, a moderate, did not ideologically represent the predominantly radical base -especially in the late s. From IU's inception, radical parties collectively had more members than did moderate parties, and radical leaders held an uninterrupted majority on the IU's national executive committee. Radicals' upper hand strengthened in the mid-to late s: in the  congressional election, the two dominant radical parties -PUM and Unión de Izquierda Revolucionaria (Union of the Revolutionary Left, UNIR) -won significantly more seats than their moderate counterparts; PUM expanded greatly in  and ;  and, in the late s, IU's three largest parties -PUM, UNIR, and the moderate PCPshifted left and established military arms.  The presence of a moderate like Barrantes at the helm thus became more of a structural problem for IU during the second half of the s.
As IU shifted to the Left, and, later, as Peru plunged into crisis, the ideological gulf between Barrantes and IU radicals widened. First, radicals objected to the close relationship that developed between Barrantes and APRA leader Alan García in the mid-s. Radicals argued that García was using Barrantes to marginalise IU radicals and thus tame and divide IU. This perception fuelled two pivotal conflicts between Barrantes and IU activists in  and  that precipitated Barrantes's mid- resignation as IU president.  Second, as Peru plunged into security and economic crisis, Barrantes argued that IU should commit to democracy, work to preserve Peru's democratic regime by collaborating with APRA and the army, and prioritise presidential victory in . Barrantes's arguments, echoed by coalition moderates, had virtually no influence on radicals. Throughout , IU's leading radical party, PUM, refused to repudiate armed struggle categorically.  Finally, Barrantes lacked strong cross-factional ties. Because he was an outsider, he did not enter IU with strong pre-existing relationships across factions. Moreover, as IU president, he did not act as a cross-factional broker or arbiter. He 'tended to be an aloof leader who was disengaged from the internal affairs  Gonzales, 'La izquierda peruana', p. .  Interview with Panfichi.  Interview with Mario Munive, radical cadre, PUM member,  Dec. .  Gonzales, 'La izquierda peruana', p. . Herrera, Izquierda Unida, pp. -, -.  Herrera, Izquierda Unida, p. .  Ibid., p. -, . The previous two paragraphs show that Barrantes did not meet the operational criteria for high ideological/programmatic representativeness (i.e., most of IU's active members did not generally support Barrantes's ideological/programmatic positions).
of IU coalition …'  By the mid-s, he advocated the expulsion of PUM and UNIR.  In resigning as IU president in mid-, he abandoned the formal pretence of standing above faction or representing the entire coalition.  Thereafter, he opted for 'marginalisation from the practical affairs of the alliance'.  For most of the s, the role of cross-factional broker was assumed by leaders of the neutral bloc, a moderate faction composed of the PCP and Left Christian independents.  The neutral bloc constituted the organisational core of IU's moderate wing, and its leaders firmly opposed any divisions or expulsions within IU.  During the second half of the s, neutral bloc leaders -especially Henry Pease -sought to fuse the radical and moderate sectors of IU into a single party.  Toward the end of the s, neutral bloc leaders such as Pease and Jorge del Prado regularly met with Barrantes, on the one hand, and radical leaders, on the other, in an attempt to maintain coalition unity. Thus, far from having cross-factional ties, Barrantes headed one of the two factions between which neutral bloc leaders mediated. 
Schism and Collapse
By the late s, Barrantes's status in IU had become a highly polarising topic within the coalition. Debate at the first IU congress in January  centred on whether he should receive the  presidential nomination.  The national executive committee, controlled by radicals, dictated that a closed  Roberts, Deepening Democracy?, p. .  Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, Chapter . Herrera, Izquierda Unida, passim.  Herrera, Izquierda Unida, p. .  Roberts, Deepening Democracy?, pp. - note .  See Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, Chapter . Roberts, Deepening Democracy?, Chapter . Herrera, Izquierda Unida, passim. Gonzales, 'La izquierda peruana', p. .  Neutral bloc leaders opposed divisions within IU for several reasons: they did not want to annul the decade-long effort to institutionalise a united Left party; they believed that a future IU government would need the support of the radical parties and their social movement partners; and they worried that the radical parties, if separated from IU, would be less capable of steering Left youth away from the Shining Path. See Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, Chapter . Roberts, Deepening Democracy?, pp. ,  note .  In Jan. , IU held its first and only national congress, and, in the lead-up to the congress, ,-, IU membership cards were distributed.  The last two paragraphs demonstrate that Barrantes did not meet the operational criteria for strong cross-factional ties (i.e., he did not meet with, or consistently support the inclusion of, a large majority of IU factions).  Herrera, Izquierda Unida, p. . Cameron, Democracy and Authoritarianism in Peru, p. .
For a comprehensive historical analysis of the IU's polarised first congress -and, in particular, of the dispute between moderates and radicals regarding whether to reject armed struggle categorically -see Feinstein, 'How the Left Was Lost'.
primary election would determine the nominee. Radicals stated their intention to field an alternative candidate. Although members of the neutral bloc supported Barrantes's nomination, they were not willing to threaten to defect with him to support a separate presidential bid; instead, they pressed Barrantes to run in the primary election. Consequently, Barrantes lacked sufficient leverage to persuade IU radicals to nominate him without an internal election. Unable to impose his candidacy undemocratically, Barrantes faced a dilemma: he could run in a closed IU primary and risk being defeated by a radical candidate, or he could defect from IU with a small club of moderate allies and run in the first round of the presidential election without IU's label and machines behind him. Barrantes believed, with reason, that he might lose a closed IU primary, as the parties of the radical bloc, given their numbers and capacity to mobilise members, had an advantage over moderates. Barrantes calculated that his best chance of winning Peru's presidency was to contest the first round on a new, non-IU ticket. If he reached the second round (a plausible prospect in late ), a Centre-Left coalition that included the core of IU would be likely to coalesce around him. By this rationale, Barrantes defected from IU -and ultimately killed it. In the  presidential election, IU candidate Henry Pease won  per cent of the vote, while Barrantes, newly divorced from IU and competing against its label and machines, garnered a mere  per cent. Shortly after, Barrantes retired from politics, and IU, mortally wounded, continued to splinter and collapsed.
Objections and Alternative Explanations
One might object to the foregoing case study by arguing that IU was bound to collapse regardless of who led it. After all, IU was not a party but a coalition of parties, and, despite a shared socialist orientation, these parties were sectarian and ideologically divergent, with social democratic elements and unreformed, revolutionary Marxist-Leninist ones.  Moreover, the crises of the late s deeply polarised IU and rendered the revolutionary Left anathema to many Peruvian voters. It might be argued, in light of these facts, that IU's split was inevitable, and that, even if IU had not split, it would have electorally collapsed. Along the same lines, one might argue that no Left leader in Peru could have simultaneously maintained the support of IU radicals -who controlled the IU's machinery -and appealed to the wider Peruvian electorate.  These objections are unpersuasive for several reasons. First, they rest on the premise that, by the end of the s, IU moderates and radicals were too polarised to collaborate or remain in alliance with each other. But this premise is demonstrably false. As already observed, only a small subset of IU moderates -Barrantes and a club of allies -chose defection over continued collaboration in . The neutral bloc, which was composed of moderates, and which surpassed the Barrantista reformist bloc in size and organisational strength, remained in IU. If Barrantes had not defected, the neutral bloc's efforts to convert IU into a party might well have succeeded.  Thus, it would be ahistorical to argue that, during the polarising, pressure-laden period of the late s, IU radicals and moderates were fated to split.
Second, it is not obvious that IU, on balance, faced greater obstacles to cohesion and survival than other new Left parties in Latin America that survived intact. A number of Latin America's successful new Left parties were, like IU, initially characterised by factionalisation, ideological difference and internecine conflict over programme, strategy and resources (e.g., Uruguay's Frente Amplio [Broad Front, FA], Brazil's PT, Mexico's PRD, El Salvador's FMLN). Moreover, there were important factors working in IU's favour. First, territorial organisation is critical for successful party-building,  and IU had one of the strongest territorial organisations on the Latin American Left during the third wave,  with constituent party branches stretching across Peru and, by the end of the s, a total of ,-, active members.  Second, IU did not attain national power during its formative years. Although this may not sound like an advantage, several high-profile new Left parties in Latin America suffered brand dilution and electorally collapsed because they quickly rose to national power and, once in government, shifted to the Right by adopting unpopular austerity policies.  By contrast, IU remained in the opposition and firmly anti-neoliberal throughout its formative decade. This benefited IU by enabling it to develop a clear Left programmatic brand.  Third,  To be sure, there is a difference between a coalition composed of parties and a party composed of factions. Yet, as noted earlier, the neutral bloc did seek to make IU a party -and almost succeeded. Had Barrantes not defected in , IU might well have become a party. Why Barrantes defected before IU could become a party is, in a sense, the question of my case study. and crucially, although the crisis of the late s exacerbated IU's internal contradictions, it also discredited IU's main rival, APRA, which was in power during the crisis. APRA's reputational collapse created an opportunity for IU to establish itself as Peru's strongest partisan organisation -and thus provided an incentive for its factions to remain united. In short, it was not necessarily obvious or inevitable, ex ante, that IU faced a more unfavourable mix of circumstances than other, ultimately successful new Left parties in Latin America.
Third, even if we concede, for the sake of argument, that IU did face a more unfavourable mix of circumstances, it does not follow that these circumstances made IU's fatal schism inevitable. Indeed, it would be facile to claim, with the benefit of hindsight, that IU's external challenges and organisational structure doomed it to failure. IU's challenges may have rendered collapse more likely than in other new Left cases, but events have multiple causes, and this article purports to identify one decisive variable in IU's split, not the only one. As noted earlier, I focus on this particular variable -the type of party leader -because it remains undertheorised in existing literature on party-building, and because it sheds new light on IU's collapse.
Fourth, although one might suppose that, if IU had not split, it still would have electorally collapsed due to voters' rejection of IU radicals' revolutionary leftism, there is evidence to the contrary. Even in the early months of , as the Shining Path was encircling Lima, national polls forecast that Barrantes and IU would finish either first or second in the  general election.  Moreover, IU performed remarkably well after Barrantes's defection. In the  congressional election, although  per cent of voters supported Barrantes's Izquierda Socialista (Socialist Left, IS), and although an unknowable and almost certainly larger number of former and prospective IU supporters flocked to non-Left alternatives -especially Alberto Fujimori and his Cambio  (Change )  it might not have won a national election, would have remained a major electoral force at the national level regardless of whether Barrantes remained at the top of the ticket. Fifth and finally, there are two forms of evidence supporting the basic counterfactual assumption on which this article rests -that an externally appealing, internally dominant IU leader could have existed and prevented a schism. First, there is within-case evidence. As already observed, several figures in IU had strong cross-factional ties, even at the end of the s (e.g., Pease, Ames, del Prado). Other figures had considerable moral authority among IU's base (e.g., Diez Canseco, PUM's leader). To imagine an externally appealing, internally dominant IU leader, we need only conceive a hypothetical scenario in which one of these leaders (e.g., Pease, del Prado, Diez Canseco) also happened to be popular with voters, or had the potential to become popular. Unless this hypothetical scenario is implausible, IU's leadership deficit was a product of misfortune, not necessity. That is, it may have been unfortunate, not necessary, that IU, instead of having a single leader who combined external appeal and internal dominance, had one leader with unrivalled popularity (i.e., Barrantes) and other leaders with key sources of internal dominance (e.g., Pease, del Prado, Diez Canseco).
Of course, one might claim that the above hypothetical scenario is implausible. One could argue, for example, that, by the late s, no leader could be acceptable to IU radicals and, simultaneously, externally appealing. Yet, such an argument implies, among other things, that IU radicals demanded a coalition leader who shared their revolutionary leftism. They did not. Although radicals opposed Barrantes's presidential nomination in , they did not demand his expulsion from IU, nor did they state that they would defect, or refuse to support him, if he won the nomination in the aforementioned closed primary. Moreover, after Barrantes's defection, radicals ultimately assented to and supported the presidential candidacy of a moderateindependent Henry Pease.
Second, there is cross-national comparative evidence for the article's basic counterfactual premise. The 'most similar' cases of Brazil's PT and Mexico's PRD further suggest that an externally appealing, internally dominant leader could have emerged in Peru during the s. Admittedly, there are no perfect cross-national comparisons, and the early PT and PRD differed from IU in numerous ways. In particular, as already noted, the early PT and PRD were both parties, not coalitions, and neither encountered circumstances as extreme as those that IU faced in the late s. Yet, the early PT and PRD did share a number of analytically relevant characteristics with IU. They were left-wing. They were born in the opposition, with limited access to state resources and mass media. They did not emerge from armed struggle -as, for example, the FMLN and FSLN did -which is relevant because shared violent struggle can generate organisational cohesion.  They had powerful grassroots organisations during their formative periods that mobilised masses of voters. They were heterogeneous fronts composed of revolutionary and reformist factions frequently engaged in ideological conflicts and power struggles. The PT and PRD depended on externally popular leaders -Lula da Silva and Cárdenas, respectively -for their early electoral competitiveness.  Their leaders, like Barrantes, suffered electoral setbacks after early breakout performances and saw their images of external appeal decline as a result.  While sharing all of these characteristics with IU, the early PT and PRD differed on () the dependent variable and () the independent variable highlighted in this article; that is, they survived intact rather than splitting (DV), and they had leaders who combined external appeal with internal dominance (IV). On this basis, I treat the PT and PRD as 'most similar' cases to IU.  The cases of the PT and PRD are both instructive for the IU case, albeit in different ways. Lula was a moderate within the PT, but he still had enormous clout with the party's 'extreme Left'.  Cárdenas was a radical within the PRD but was still, by far, the party's most electable figure. Although, again, there are many differences between IU, PT and PRD, these basic facts at least suggest that, in a possible world, an IU moderate could have acquired the support of IU radicals, or an IU radical could have been externally appealing.
Let us look a bit closer at both cases, beginning with the PRD. Cárdenas had immense moral authority on the Mexican Left, largely due to his lineage.  He cultivated cross-factional ties as PRD leader.  He ideologically represented the predominantly radical PRD rank-and-file.  Consequently, he dominated the PRD's internal affairs.  He played a 'substituting role for the [PRD's] lack of institutionalisation',  regularly making key party decisions and adjudicating internal conflicts without debate or negotiation.  In contrast to Barrantes, he succeeded in securing the PRD's presidential candidacy repeatedly in ,  and , with limited internal resistance.
Lula was similarly dominant within the PT.  He was a morally authoritative figure, given his humble origins, working-class status, and leadership role in the PT's founding labour and democratising struggles.  He had strong preexisting cross-factional ties and maintained them as PT leader, serving as the party's main negotiator and guarantor of agreements.  In ideological and programmatic terms, he represented the predominantly moderate PT rankand-file, drawn primarily from Lula's own labour union movement.  Lula secured the PT's presidential candidacy four times, with virtually no internal contestation, and prevailed upon the PT's radical tendencies to moderate their rhetoric and demands in an effort to broaden the party's electoral appeal.  The divergent fates of IU, PT and PRD suggest the vital role that party leaders can play in new party survival. Lula and Cárdenas dictated the internal affairs of their parties and repeatedly won their parties' presidential nominations with ease, even when their ideological opponents controlled their national party organisations (e.g., Lula in ), and even when their images of electoral clout had suffered due to landslide losses in presidential elections (e.g., Lula in ; Cárdenas in ). Because they were internally dominant, they never had strong incentives to defect from the early PT and PRD.
Barrantes's experience as IU leader starkly contrasts with Lula's and Cárdenas's. In contrast to Lula, Barrantes showed almost no capacity to tame IU radicals. In contrast to Cárdenas, Barrantes did not function as IU's informal decider or arbiter.  In contrast to both leaders, Barrantes was never described as the 'moral' leader of IU. Most importantly, he ultimately proved unable to secure IU's presidential nomination, which triggered his fatal defection.
It is also worth noting that in unprompted statements during interviews with the author, three top IU elites, all belonging to different factions, cited leadership as a key variable, or the key variable, that distinguished IU from the PT (Henry Pease, Javier Diez Canseco and Santiago Pedraglio). 
Conclusion
This article has argued that externally appealing, internally dominant leaders can prevent new party schisms, and it has illustrated the mechanisms of this argument at work in the representative case of Peru's IU. The article makes several main contributions. First, it proposes an original, empirically grounded theory that contributes to an emerging body of literature on the sources of new party cohesion (see Introduction). Second, through an application of this theory, it sheds new light on a consequential event, IU's schism. Third, and most broadly, the article posits that the type of leader a new party has can be critical for its success or failure. As noted in the Introduction, scholars of party-building rarely focus on the role of leaders, for fear of excessive voluntarism. Consequently, the relationship between leader type and party-building outcome -particularly in its positive variants -remains undertheorised. Given the weakness of party systems in much of the developing world, and the importance of strong parties to democratic quality and stability, this relationship merits serious research, and the current article is an attempt to contribute to that research.
Briefly in closing, does the argument in this article contain any lessons for Peru's new Left party, the Frente Amplio (Broad Front, FA), and its leader, Verónika Mendoza? In the  general election, the FA became the first left-wing party in decades to achieve electoral success at the national level. Mendoza was placed third in the first round of the presidential election, with  per cent of the vote, and FA candidates garnered  per cent of the overall congressional vote. But party-building is a very difficult task.  In order to take root, new parties generally need to have, among other things,  For example, whereas Cárdenas unilaterally vetoed early calls for a unanimity requirement in the PRD's national executive committee, Barrantes tried and failed to do the same in the early s.  These interviews took place on , , and  Jan. , respectively. In addition, in the already cited interview with the author, Tanaka, when prompted, argued that the differences between Barrantes and Lula were analytically significant.  Levitsky et al., 'Introduction: Challenges of Party-Building'. a strong territorial organisation composed of committed activists, which IU had, and which FA lacks. On the other hand, FA is not facing some of IU's contextual or organisational challenges (e.g., sectarian factions; profound national crisis). The article's theoretical argument carries lessons for FA leader, Verónika Mendoza. At present, FA depends on Mendoza's external electoral appeal. Yet, to be an internally dominant figure, and thus to minimise the likelihood of schism, Mendoza cannot rely on external appeal alone. She must strive to represent her active base, to forge constructive relationships across the factions, and, to the extent possible, TO draw upon any special sources of moral authority that she might have (e.g., fluency in Quechua). These measures may help her to keep FA united, which in turn will help FA's electoral (and therefore survival) prospects.
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